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Abstract:
We derive expressions for optimal consumption for family trusts with random wealth
and uncertain survival. Using UK birth statistics and the theory of branching processes,
we compute size and survival probabilities for single and multiple-branch families. Sur-
vival for a single-branch family is approximated by a Pareto distribution and consumption
policies exhibit decreasing discount rates but multiple-branch families use non-monotonic
discount rates. When trust distributions depend on the number of beneciaries rather
than the survival of the whole family unit, spending paths depend on expected member-
ship and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. We report examples of consumption
paths for a range of family trusts with CRRA preferences.
JEL Classi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Many problems in economics and nance require planning over long time horizons and
in all such problems the discount rate is critical. Researchers from Ramsey (1928) to
Stern (2006) have recognized that choosing a discount rate is not always a disinterested
decision but frequently represents some amalgamation of economic sciencewith inter-
generational ethics or politics.
While it is analytically convenient for economists to choose non-stochastic boundaries
(either xed or innite) for multi-period problems, more often than not a problems
inherent uncertainty extends beyond, say, random investment payo¤s or uncertain income,
to the horizon itself. If the planning horizon is stochastic, discounting cannot arbitrarily
be xed at some unobserved level of impatience: it must be treated as a function of the
probability density of the horizon. Further, stochastic horizon problems are ubiquitous.
The simplest individual consumption problems are subject to uncertainty over the length
of life, and the same is true of the majority of plans for rms, nancial institutions,
governments and societies.
Time-varying discounting has sometimes been used to harmonize observed patterns of
behaviour with the predictions of theory and attributed to weak ethics, a lack of altruism
on the part of the decision-maker or an intrinsic psychological preference for near-term
gratication. For example, hyperbolic discounting is a well-known explanation for anom-
alous savings behaviour (see, for example, Phelps and Pollack, 1968; Laibson, 1998).
However a more recent literature (Sozou 1998; Dasgupta and Maskin 2005; Bommier
2006) has shown that regardless of psychological or ethical considerations, horizon uncer-
tainty alone may be a su¢ cient explanation for some examples of hyperbolic discounting.
Here we o¤er a new explanation for time-varying discounting that does not rely on
arguments relating to the failure of altruism or fundamental tastes, requiring only rational
uncertainty over the long-term survival of the planning entity. Since, as we show below,
the empirical survival function of a multi-generation family from a single progenitor
has a hazard rate that declines with the age of the family, hyperbolic discounting may
apply to the planning problem of the family trust. In the case where the family begins
with several branches, the discount function is non-monotone, with hazard rates that
increase for several generations before declining hyperbolically. Further, if the family
does not pass all wealth to a single heir but distributes according to the number of
surviving members, then the discount function depends on expected family growth and
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
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Since we assume that trusts are risk neutral over survival and that subjective time
preference is constant, discount rates are not revised with the passage of time (unless
new information on survival arrives) and plans are time-consistent.
We use numerical optimization methods calibrated to UK birth statistics and a repre-
sentative investment model to estimate optimal spending paths for a family trust begun
by a single progenitor, by three progenitors, and for a trust which distributes according
to the number of members, where all are maintained along one gender line. (We make use
of the theory of branching processes to calculate the probability of family size and family
extinction at each generation.) For a foundation or trust distributing without regard to
family size and expecting real investment returns at 4.75% each year, the ideal annual
spending rate for the single progenitor trust begins around 2.1% of wealth, compared
with the innite horizon optimal rate of 1.54%, and declines slowly as the generations
pass. For a trust distributing according to membership with a power utility parameter
of 2, the spending rate begins low, at just above 1%, before gradually increasing above
the innite horizon rate and then declining.
2 Literature
In his pioneering work on aggregate savings, Ramsey (1928) asserts that any positive
discounting of the future is ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of
the imagination. Ramsey actually relents from his uncompromising view by using a non-
zero discount rate in the analysis which follows this statement, but he does rule out the
possibility of savings being selshly consumed by a subsequent generation. Others are
less optimistic about the strength of imagination than Ramsey, allowing that the current
generation could be less-than-perfectly altruistic towards future generations. Phelps and
Pollack (1968), for example, consider a multi-generation model in which consumption
in period t is discounted by bt; where  is the rate of time preference and b (0 < b; 1)
represents the current generations altruism. The closer b is to one, the more concerned
is the current generation about the welfare of future generations. They recognize that if
succeeding generations have these same quasi-hyperbolic preferences but cannot control
the savings behaviour of their descendants, the outcome is a Nash-equilibrium where
saving is lower than the Pareto-optimal level. The current generation rationally consume
faster than the Pareto-optimal rate in an e¤ort to limit over-spending by their children
and grandchildren.
Similar outcomes can occur when a bu¤er-stock consumer plays an intra-personal
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game with future selves(Laibson, 1998; Harris and Laibson, 2001). The current self, a
hyperbolic discounter, expects future selvesto over-consume relative to the current selfs
preferences. The e¤ective rate of impatience in this case depends on future scarcity, is
stochastic, and endogenous to the model. Laibson (1998) and Laibson et al. (1998) argue
that this type of discounting can explain savings behaviour that seems inconsistent with
a standard exponentially discounted model, results in welfare losses, and can help explain
the documented tendency among people and animals to discount near events more than
distant events (Loewenstein and Thaler, 1989; Ainslie, 1974).
On the other hand, more recent explanations for decreasing rates of time preference
arise from horizon uncertainty rather than preferences for short-term gratication. Sozou
(1998) looks at an uncertain future payo¤ of xed size where the probability of receiving
the payo¤ in any future period is determined by an exponential survival function with
constant hazard rate. However if the consumer does not know the true underlying value
of the hazard rate, but holds a prior belief that it is exponentially distributed, then he
or she will compute a hyperbolic discount function by Bayesian updating.
Dasgupta and Maskin (2005) argue that while both a declining hazard rate and So-
zous analysis can produce hyperbolic discounting behaviour in the sense of decreasing
impatience, these cannot explain preference reversals, where a consumer switches from
one course of action to another simply because of the passage of time, or time-inconsistent
behaviour. Dasgupta and Maskins own explanation for hyperbolic discounting rests on
uncertainty over when, rather than just whether, a payo¤ will be realized. This addi-
tional dimension of uncertainty can result in a preference reversal, and if learning is also
needed, can generate time-inconsistency.
Life-cycle consumption and investment problems frequently model horizon uncertainty
as stochastic individual mortality with non-constant hazard rates. (See, for example,
Yaari 1965; Hubbard Skinner and Zeldes 1995; and for a survey of recent actuarial lit-
erature, Pitacco 2004). In a new insight, Bommier (2006) introduces risk preferences
over the length of life to an intertemporal consumption model, demonstrating that stan-
dard treatments of individual survival uncertainty assume risk neutrality over lifetimes.
Among other general results, he shows that hyperbolic discounting will be exhibited by
individuals who have no pure time preferencebut have a hyperbolic risk aversion to
length of life, so that attitudes to future mortality risk rather than future consumption
risk create near-term impatience.
Here we extend this line of research by deriving the general result that rational agents
facing uncertainty over a long-term planning horizon will exhibit hyperbolic discounting
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when survival is Pareto distributed and agents have risk neutral preferences over survival.
Pareto distributed survival implies declining hazard rates and consequently decreasing
impatience over more distant events. Further, we demonstrate that family survival from
a single progenitor may be well represented by a Pareto density. We also investigate
related questions of family survival: when more than one branch of the family survives,
hazard rates are not monotonically declining and discounting functions are not uniformly
hyperbolic, and when distributions depend on the number of family members rather than
just survival, discounting reects fertility and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Models where hyperbolic discounting arises from the psychological tastes of the decision-
maker predict preference reversals and dynamic inconsistency (Laibson 1998, Bommier
2006). Inconsistencies arise because the discount rate that was applied to a specic fu-
ture date changes to a higher rate as the date moves closer to the decision period. By
contrast in our analysis, the discount factor depends on the absolute age of the family
rather than its age relative to the current period. Consequently, in the absence of new
information about future survival probabilities, the survival function of the family is not
revised as time passes and plans will be time-consistent (assuming risk neutrality with
respect to survival). However if the family receives new information on fertility status,
either on the number of survivors or on their prospects for having children, the trust
may revise estimates of the survival density and consequently change future consumption
plans. This does not imply time-inconsistency in the usual sense, just path-dependency
in the optimal plan.
Our discussion so far has treated the problem of maximizing family or multi-generational
utility as equivalent to maximising an individuals utility over an uncertain lifetime. This
approach is typical of unitary models of intergenerational transfers where the head,
altruistor dictatorallocates consumption among current and future members of the
family so that the welfare of the family is indistinguishable from the welfare of the head
(Becker 1974; 1981). For the analysis of a family trust, the unitary model provides an
important special case. For headwe can substitute the label establisher, whose utility
function is embodied in the trust deed and executed over the life of the trust by the
trustee. Indeed, one reason for creating a trust is to ensure that the preferences of the
original family head are put into e¤ect, overriding any deviation motivated by the pref-
erences and strategies of future beneciaries. If co-operative bargaining could produce
the same allocation arrangement (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981)
or if it could be ensured by family social capital or a self-enforcing family constitution
via exchange (Cigno 1993; 2006; 2007), then the trust deed would be redundant. The
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fact that trust deeds exist is evidence that the family is a place of both conict and
cooperation(Xu 2007).
Even so, empirical evidence shows that most people plan to divide their estates equally
among their children (Light and McGarry 2004) and it is worth investigating the optimal
plans of a trust that cares about more than a single heir. If total utility is comprised of
the utility of current and future generations, in the style of Becker and Tomes (1986) or
Becker and Barro (1988), and where consumption is divided equally among children in
each time period and then aggregated, not only survival, but also the expected number
of family members, matters to the optimal disbursement of trust funds. In this case,
discounting depends on expected fertility as well as simple survival.
The theory of discounting under horizon uncertainty is outlined in section 3. In section
4 we estimate the survival function of a representative UK family beginning with an
individual progenitor: we nd that the Pareto distribution is a good t to current fertility
data for this case, that extinction is certain at observed birth rates, and that the mean
survival of a UK family is about six generations. We also estimate the survival function
of a family with more than one original branch (k progenitors) and derive expressions
for the expected path of family size over time. Numerical estimates of optimal spending
paths (section 5) for a family trust from a single progenitor using the estimated hyperbolic
discounting function are shallow curves, always above the innite-horizon spending rate,
whereas for the multi-branch family they are non-monotonic. Further, when distributions
depend on the number of surviving members, the pattern is reversed, with spending rates
rising over time initially before decreasing later. Section 6 concludes.
3 Discounting under survival uncertainty
Our problem is to generalize the model of optimal drawdown for an innitely-lived entity
facing uncertain investment returns (Ingersoll 1987; Korn and Korn 2001) to include
the case where the survival of the entity is also uncertain (Dasgupta and Maskin 2005;
Bommier 2006). For a family trust, consumption stands for payments to current family
beneciaries, funded from an investment portfolio.
In most common law jurisdictions a family trust deed is invalid if it attempts to tie
up wealth for the benet of generations not yet in existence.1 The common law rule
against perpetuities (Burke 1976), or codied law relating to the same issue, usually
1We thank Mr Vincent Taubman of TD Asset Management for drawing our attention to some of the
legal constraints on trust deeds and trustees.
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requires the interest (assets) in the trust to be passed to beneciaries within 80 or 90
years. However some US jurisdictions allow large dynastic trusts to escape the rule and
exist for much longer (or perpetually) before vesting. In our analysis we assume either
that the trust is exempt from the rule against perpetuities and can create a trust deed
for future generations, or that the trust continues under a rollingdeed which the family
voluntarily recreates at each generation. This latter assumption allows the family to
review its fertility status and survival distribution at any generation and revise the trust
deed accordingly.
We consider two cases: one where the family has a single utility function and another
where utility is an aggregation of the utilities of individual beneciaries. For the uni-
tary utility case, we treat family extinction as a random time. When family utility is
an aggregation of the utilities of individual beneciaries, the number of surviving family
members is intrinsic to the objective function, and since the trust terminates when mem-
bership goes to zero, we consider only family size as a measure of extinction. Although
the aggregate utility function described below in equation (13) introduces one form of
risk aversion over family survival (proxied by the number of family members), the more
general treatment of risk aversion over length of life expressed in Bommier (2006) could
also be applied to family survival. This is a much more complex problem which we leave
for future work.
We do not specify the distribution of investment returns, except that they are assumed
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). The trust is extinguished when the family
ceases, so we treat residual trust funds as having no utility value when the family is not
alive to enjoy them.
3.1 Unitary utility
We begin with the case where the distribution of the trust funds among the family matters
only in aggregate, as would be the case where the trust deed requires inheritance to pass
to one heir, or where the trust treats the consumption of individuals in the family at
time t as perfectly substitutable. It follows that consumption of the beneciaries in each
period can be treated as a single sum and horizon uncertainty relates to the survival of
the family as a whole.
Let T be the random time the family survives. We treat the survival time as a con-
tinuous random variable and denote as pdf(t) the probability density of T , the extinction
density with distribution function F (t), and F (t) its complementary distribution func-
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tion. It follows that @
F (t)
@t
=  pdf(t), and F (0) = 1; F (1) = 0; so that the family
survives almost surely in period zero but eventual extinction is inevitable. We discuss
the inevitability of extinction further below.
The trust aims to maximize expected utility for as long as the family survives, where
utility is derived from consumption (the distributions of funds) out of stochastic wealth.
The family has an individual utility function, an assumption that we will relax below.
Let the utility of consumption be U [C (t)] = U [C (t)]h (t) where h(t) is some positive
discount function expressing general impatience; possibly h(t) = 1, and for now we assume
h(0) = 1. If we write EC to mean expectation over consumption the value of expected
utility conditioning on survival until time t is:
L (t) = EC
Z t
0







L (t) pdf (t) dt (2)
is the unconditional value.





















F (t) U [C (t)] dt

; (3)




F (t) U [C (t)] dt

; (4)
by using the fact that the rst expression in (3) is zero when EC
R 0
0
U [C (s)] ds

= 0:
If survival is exponentially distributed with a constant hazard rate F (t) = exp ( t) ;
and if general impatience is constant so that h (t) = exp ( pt) where p is the impatience




exp (  (p+ ) t)U [C (t)] dt

: (5)
In other words, uncertainty over family survival simply increases impatience by a constant
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hazard rate, raising consumption permanently above the optimal rate for an innitely-
lived dynasty.
However this analysis can also deal with hyperbolic discounting and quasi-hyperbolic
discounting. Dene hyperbolic discounting as a discount function
D (t) = (1 + t) = ;  > 0;  > 0; (6)
and quasi-hyperbolic discounting by
D (t) = bt; 0 < b < 1; 0 <  < 1: (7)
If we arbitrarily set general impatience at zero so that h(t) = 1, then the survival function
is
F (t) = (1 + t) = ; (8)
and
pdf (t) =  (1 + t) (=+1) (9)
is the density of family extinction, whilst for quasi-hyperbolic discounting the survival
function is
F (t) = bt;
and the density of family extinction is







The rst density (9) can be thought of as Pareto, where the family survives almost surely
in the initial period F (0) = 1, but is extinct in the limit F (1) = 0. The second (10)
is not normalized in that F (0) = b; and F (1) = 0: If  = exp ( ) ;  > 0, and
F (t) = b exp ( t), this is similar to (5) and corresponds to the case where a proportion
of families, (1   b), die initially at t = 0; so F (0) = b. However, we could also have the
case of a degenerate extinction probability in that F (t) = (1  ) +  F  (t) where F  (t)
has the usual property ensuring extinction in the limit, F  (1) = 0. This brings about
no important changes but allows us to incorporate (1  ), a nite probability that the
family will last forever.
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3.2 Individual utility
An alternative representation treats the family size as a non-negative process N(t) with
an absorbing state at N(t) = 0; and views utility as an aggregation of the individual





N(t). The probability of any future event N(t) is
known but not controlled by the trustees or the beneciaries. In this specication family
size determines extinction, that is, the family is extinct when the N(t) process reaches
zero for the rst time and we simply consider the path of expected consumption and












Particular choices of ~U () lead to particular solutions. We shall assume a power or
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form, the same for each trust beneciary, and
constant across generations so that
~U (C(t)) =
C(t)1 











and this specication leads to a Cobb-Douglasversion of utility with constant returns








In numerical examples below we model the distribution of the process N(t) as known
and outside the control of the trust beneciaries. Becker and Barro (1988) analyse a
similar problem under certainty over returns to wealth and where fertility and consump-
tion are choice variables. Our trustee can choose only consumption but returns to wealth
and family size are both (independent) random processes. And since, like Becker and
Barro, we treat the path of N(t) as predictable from t = 0 and make the preferences of
the family (trustee) constant, the optimal path for distributions will be time-consistent
if general impatience is also constant.
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4 Estimating family extinction
We now apply this analysis by estimating the density function of survival for a represen-
tative UK family using current fertility data.
Theories of family extinction and the related literature on branching processes are
associated with Sir Francis Galton, who posed the problem of the survival of aristocratic
surnames in 1873 (see Harris, 1963; Kendall, 1966). Despite the fact that this is a
standard problem in population studies, it appears that few empirical estimates of family
extinction are available (Albertsen, 1995). But the question remains interesting in the
light of changing fertility patterns over the past century where extinction probabilities
have increased in many countries as fertility has declined. In the UK for example, the
number of children of either sex being born to each woman (total fertility rate) was around
1.79 in 2005, which is below the long-term replacement rate of 2.1 required to maintain a
stable population and much less than the 1960 peak total fertility rate of 2.95. Similarly,
the OECD-30 average fertility rate in 2004 was 1.6, with birth rates of below 1.3 children
per woman in Japan and some European countries, and as low as 1.2 in Korea (OECD
2007). Hence family survival prospects in OECD countries are now much lower than they
were thirty years ago.
Early studies of family survival are rare, but those that do exist estimate limiting
extinction probabilities less than one reecting higher fertility rates in the past. For ex-
ample, Lotka (1931) published an estimate of 0.8797 for the probability of male line ex-
tinction for the US white population of 1920, and Keytz (1968) calculated the likelihood
of female line extinction at 0.8206 using 1960-61 US data, along with similar calculations
for Hungary, Israel, Mexico and Japan. Hull (1998) reconsidered Lotkas calculations in
the context of a population with two sexes and concluded that, under some restrictions
over the availability of partners to the males of concern, the extinction probability lay in
the range (0.856, 0.992], not greatly di¤erent from Lotkas original estimate.
Our estimation follows the method of Keytz (1968): beginning with the o¢ cial UK
statistics on the distribution of women born in 1960 by number of live births at age 45, we
adjust this probability to the number of daughters (assuming that male and female births
are equally likely) and then compute the probability that the female line becomes extinct
in the limit along with the probability that the line becomes extinct at or before any
particular generation. We cannot be sure that the same distribution of birth probabilities
applies to the male line, since paternity data collected in the UK are incomplete and there
is no comparable table of birth probabilities for men, but it is plausible that a dynasty
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which passes its wealth through sons rather than daughters might face similar survival
probabilities. (Modern families may be less likely to be concerned with surname survival
and more likely to pass wealth to sons and daughters than to favour either gender. This
more general problem requires a di¤erent survival model with specic limits on partnering
and population growth, and we leave it to future research.)
In addition, we assume that the group of families who create inherited trusts have
fertility patterns the same as the 1960 birth cohort of women and that this pattern
remains constant into the future. While there might be reasons to assume higher fertility
among wealthier families because of better health prospects, lower fertility is also possible
because of the well-documented tendency for more educated women to begin families
later, resulting in fewer children (Rendall et al. 2005). In addition, fertility rates are
not constant through time, having been declining in many countries since the middle of
last century. For some countries including the UK, this decline seems to have slowed or
reversed recently (see O¢ ce for National Statistics 2006, Table 1.4). For England and
Wales, for example, the average number of live daughters a woman of child-bearing age of
a particular cohort can expect to have in her lifetime (Gross Reproduction Rate) rose to
0.88 in 2005 from a low point of 0.81 in 2000. Since it is di¢ cult to predict the long-term
path of wealthy family fertility, we work with current population averages and project
them into the future.
Further, we treat the fertility outcome as a random draw from the distribution of
family size per female; we do not allow the mother to choose the number of her children.
Survey analysis (OECD 2007) reports that women in most developed countries, including
the UK, have fewer children than they want, on average, which is evidence that family
size is not always a choice variable.
4.1 Family size and survival along a single branch
In 1930, two Danish mathematicians, Ste¤ensen and Christensen, separately and simul-
taneously solved Galtons problem of surname survival. (Their work was reprinted in
English in 1995, see Ste¤ensen 1995; and Albertsen and Kristensen 1995. For a general
introduction to branching processes see Taylor and Karlin 1998, chapter III.) Suppose
that a mother (father) produces a random number  of daughters (sons) with probability
distribution
Pr f = kg = ak for k = 0; 1; ::: (15)
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where ak  0 and
1X
k=0
ak = 1: In what follows we treat the ak as known and constant
through time. The family size process fGgg at generation g is a Markov chain where each









where (g 1)j is the number of children born at generation g to o¤spring j; j = 1; ::; Gg 1,
from the previous generation, g   1:
Following Taylor and Karlin (1998) we can write the probability generating function
for  at the rst generation as








k; for 0  s  1 (17)









The distribution of family size (measured by number of children of one gender) at any
generation Gg can be derived from the probability generating function at generation g
where g (s) is the outcome of the iteration





This iteration allows us to map one-to-one from g (s) into the probability mass function
for family size at any generation and estimate values for N(t) in the utility function of
equation (13). To specify the process fully we need numerical values for ak; which we
assign below.
Further, using the properties of i.i.d. random sums, it is straightforward to show that
if  is the expected number of daughters in the rst generation from a single mother and
 < 1, then the expected family size at generation g is
E (Gg) = g (19)
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and











= var (Gg) + E2 (Gg).
Ste¤ensen and Christensen proved that the probability that any family line reaches
extinction at generation g, xg; can be computed iteratively by the recursion




g 1 + :::; (21)
where xg 1 is the probability of extinction at or before generation g   1.
Likewise, the probability that a family eventually reaches extinction along the female
or male line depends on the average number of daughters (sons) born to women (men)
in the family. The expected number of children of one gender or the other born to any
individual mother or father can be written as
01 (s) js=1 = E () =  = a1 + 2a2 + 3a3 + :::: (22)
In the limit as g !1; xg ! 1, when  < 1. So in the case where the expected number
of daughters born to mothers is greater than one, the probability of family survival down
the female line, (1  ), is non-zero in the limit. In the case where  < 1, F (1) = 0 and
the family will eventually become extinct.
4.1.1 Fertility probabilities
To compute the survival probabilities, we set the probability of family extinction x1 = a0,
where a0 is the probability that the rst female in the family (the establisher of the trust)
has no daughters. We assume that the probability that each generation has exactly zero,
one, two or more daughters is the same for this particular family as for a representative
cohort of mothers, so we can estimate a series for the extinction probability xg using UK
national cohort data on births. We also assume that each subsequent generation has the
same constant and known fertility distribution.
Table 1 sets out the probability that a woman born in 1960 in England or Wales has
a specied number of live-born children by age 45. These data are taken from Table 10.5
of the UK O¢ ce of National Statistics Birth Statistics (FM1 no.34, 2006) and are derived
from data on registered birth by year of occurrence and age of mother, but reported in
Table 10.5 by mothers year of birth. We use the 1960 cohort of women since they were
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the youngest who had reached age 45 at the time of our study and therefore more likely
to represent future fertility patterns than older cohorts. We treat the mothers as having
no more children after age 45 since the Birth Statistics tables include any births to older
mothers in the 45 years data. Average age at rst birth for this birth cohort is 27.8, and
higher (over 30) for more educated women (see Rendall et al. 2005). In addition we limit
the mothers to a maximum of four children each, since the Birth Statistics do not report
probabilities for larger families, specifying only the percentage of mothers born in 1960
who at age 45 had four or morechildren.
By assuming that girls and boys are equally likely to be born live (boys are actually
slightly more likely to be born than girls, but also su¤er higher average mortality for
most of life), we also derive the corresponding probability that a woman gives birth to
the specied number of girls, where the probability of K = k girls among R  4 children
is






The values in the lowest row of Table 1 are estimates of the probability that a par-
ticular family has exactly zero, one, two, three or four or more daughters, that is, ak in
equations (22) and (21). By substituting these values into (22) and checking whether
 < 1, we can infer the overall likelihood of family extinction along the female line. The
expected number of daughters to a woman born in 1960 is 0:949 < 1, which satises the
condition for eventual family extinction.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Further, by substituting these values into (21), setting the initial probability of extinc-
tion at x0 = 0; (the family founder survives in the rst generation), and then generating
fxgg1g=1 recursively, we can compute the likelihood that the representative family becomes
extinct at or before any particular future generation. The generational survival proba-
bility of the single-branch family, s(1)g = 1   xg; derived using the probabilities in Table
1, begins at one initially, decreases steeply over the rst few generations and converges
slowly towards zero, as we can see from the second column in Table 2. The expected
family size follows a similar pattern (column four).
[Insert Table 2 here]
The generation g hazard rate, (1)g , that is the risk of extinction at the current genera-
tion conditioning on the family having survived so far, is set out in column three of Table
2. Since the estimated hazard rate is declining with time, we expect that family trustees
with rational uncertainty over survival will discount future consumption with decreasing
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impatience as the time horizon lengthens.
4.1.2 Approximate distributions
In section 3 above, we proposed that the planning horizon, here limited by family survival,
might be exponentially distributed, so that F (t) = exp ( t) ; or Pareto distributed
so that F (t) = (1 + t) =. The recursively computed survival function in Table 2
represents a discrete analogue to the continuous cumulative survival distribution F (t).
By tting both an exponential and a hyperbolic curve to the discrete survival function,
we can estimate values for the constant exponential hazard rate exp, and the parameters
of the hyperbolic function,  and .
To nd the best tting continuous distribution function, we calculate 100 generations
of discrete survival probabilities si, and space each generation 30 years apart (Tremblay
and Vezina 2003). We then t the curve,
sexp;i = exp ( exp30i) = exp ( expt) (24)






(si   sexp;i)2 =
100X
i=0
(si   exp ( exp30i))2 : (25)
The tted exponential curve is shown in Figure 1. Here, ̂exp = 0:0095, which is
analogous to a constant discrete-time subjective discount factor, of 0.991 per year. In
other words, under these assumptions, an expectation of current average rates of family
extinction creates mild impatience. However the graph shows that the t of the function
is poor, with the exponential approximation under-predicting and then over-predicting
discrete recursive survival probabilities. The sum of scaled squared errors, a guide to the






mean time to extinction under the estimated exponential distribution is 105.3 years, or
3.51 generations of 30 years.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
A hyperbolic function is a better approximation to the family survival function. Using
the same recursively computed discrete survival probabilities, we t the Pareto function
shyp;i = (1 +  (30i))
 = ;  > 0;  > 0 (26)
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where the parameters  and  are estimated by minimizing the sum of squared errors,
min
;
f (; ) =
100X
i=0




si   [1 +  (30i)] =
2
: (27)





the estimated parameter values are ̂ = 0:0112 and ̂ = 0:0165. In this case the sum of






= 0:245, which is much lower than for




t (1 + t) (=+1) dt =

1 + t






    (28)












(   ) (1 + t)= 1
; (29)
which goes to zero when = > 1:)
[Insert Figure 2 here]
For the estimated parameter values ̂ = 0:0112 and ̂ = 0:0165, the expected value
of the distribution, or the mean survival of the typical UK family from this cohort is
188.7 years, or 6.3 generations of 30 years. Hence the Pareto distribution predicts a much
slower mean extinction time than the exponential distribution.
Had we a longer sample of data on fertility, we could make a statistical comparison
between the rival exponential and hyperbolic functions, but that would also entail dealing
with some complex issues of testing. Statistically, the exponential distribution is nested
inside the hyperbolic distribution, being the special case where  = 0. This restriction
corresponds to a boundary value for the parameter space of beta values for the hyperbolic
distribution. Further, the distribution of a test statistic based upon likelihood ratio
principles is a weighted sum of chi squared variables with the weights depending upon
nuisance parameters. Since we have only one observation on birth patterns we shall
content ourselves with maximizing goodness of t, both on visual grounds, and in terms
of sum of squared errors, and continue to work with the assumption that the survival
probabilities are known with certainty.
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whereas the exponential hazard rate is the constant exp. We compare the constant
exponential hazard with the hyperbolic hazard in Figure 3, where the 300 years along
the horizontal axis corresponds to ten 30-year generations. Over that time the hyper-
bolic hazard rate declines from around 0.0163 to close to 0.0038, against the constant
exponential approximation of 0.0095.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
4.2 Family survival with multiple branches
If, at some arbitrarily chosen generation g0, there were found to be k surviving daughters
(potential mothers), the future survival density will be determined by the compound
probability that all of the k branches of the family reach extinction by a particular future
generation, given that k mothers survive at g0 almost surely. By independence, the
probability of extinction at or before generation g0 + h, is (xg0+h)
k where xg0+h is the
probability that a single branch of the family is extinct at or before generation g0 + h
computed using equation (21), and k is the number of branches or originating matriarchs
in the family (xg0 = 0; for all k). All branches reach extinction in the limit, but the
likelihood of survival at any g0 + h increases as k increases.
Figure 4 graphs the hazard rate at each generation for k = 1; 2; : : : ; 5, computed using
the fertility data from Table 1 and the recursion,
sg0+h = 1  (xg0+h)







[Insert Figure 4 here]
When the family has a single branch, the hazard rate is monotonically decreasing,
but in the multiple branch family hazard functions are not generally monotone. Figure
4 shows that the empirical hazard rate increases for the rst few generations, reaches a
maximum, and then declines as the survival c.d.f. approaches zero. For the family with
two branches, this maximum is at the second generation, but as the number of branches
increases, the maximum moves to a later generation, so that for the ve-branch family
the maximum occurs at h = 6. Consequently a monotonically decreasing discounting
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function is not a true reection of the survival density in multiple-branch families. Table
2 reports the survival probability, hazard rate and expected family membership for a
family with three branches in period zero.
If the survival density of the single branch is Pareto as in equation (9), the cumulative
extinction density for k branches is
F (tjk) = F (t)k =
h




pdf (tjk) = k
h
1  (1 + t) =
ik 1
 (1 + t) (=+1) : (33)
The survival function is therefore
F (tjk) = 1  F (tjk) = 1 
h
1  (1 + t) =
ik
; (34)





kF (t)k 1 (1 + t) (=+1)
1  F (t)k
: (35)
Di¤erentiating (35) with respect to t, and setting the rst order condition equal to
zero yields an implicit solution for the time where the hazard rate is maximized: choosing












  k (1 + t) =
: (36)
After this point, the discount function is approximately hyperbolic, but prior to this
point, the discount function exhibits increasing hazards.
Applying the multi-branch family survival function will reweight the timing of con-
sumption to favour periods when survival probabilities are high, other thing being equal.
Rates of spending will increase towards t then decline from that time into the future. In
section 5 we report an example of optimal drawdown for a 3-branch family.
Having derived an approximate survival density for a family, we can now apply the
analysis of section 3 and section 4 to the trust planning problem.
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5 Consumption plans for a family trust
Here we present estimates of the impact of uncertain survival on the optimal drawdown
rate of a family trust under the range of scenarios discussed above.
We rst solve the problem for a perpetual trust established by a single ancestor with
a deed extending to future generations, and derive the optimal path conditioning on in-
formation about family fertility at time zero. A second formulation of the problem allows
the family to begin with more than one branch and a third approach allows the family
to project the number of surviving members at some future point in time and change
benet payments according to the number of existing and expected future members. The
second formulation deals with the multiple-branch family still using a unitary utility func-
tion. Unlike the single branch case, the multiple branch family does not use a hyperbolic
discount function, but a non-monotone function, with slower rates of consumption in
the near future and higher, decreasing rates later, consistent with the hazard function
described in section 4.2. (We compute the example for a family beginning with three
progenitors.) In the third formulation, we report results for the utility function described
by equation (13), where the expected future family size inuences spending plans.
Consider the discrete-time approximation to the utility maximization problem set out
in equation (4). The family trust plans to maximize expected utility over consumption Ct
(payments to beneciaries or disbursements to worthy causes, viewed either as a unitary
sum or per family member), by choosing each period a drawdown from uncertain wealth
mtWt, where the gross returns to the trusts investment portfolio are denoted ~Zt.
For the rst two cases we can work with the same objective function. We represent
the probability of family survival at time t by the time-varying parameter, t, where t
now takes integer values for years. This parameter can be interpreted as a discrete-time
analogue to the continuous cumulative survival density F (t)and represents the discount
factor at time t. For the single branch family t = (1 + t)
 = which is monotonically
declining, and when there are k progenitors t = 1  [1  (1 + t) =]k which rises and
then declines.
Assuming that utility is time-separable and additive, the trusts problem is to maxi-











; where 0 < t < 1; (37)
Ct = mtWt (38)
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and
Wt = (1 mt 1)Wt 1 ~Zt 1; W0 = W: (39)





Dene the accumulated value of one unit of wealth invested at time t = 0 and held until





If ~Zi are also non-negative and independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), then
~Vt 1







is constant for all t, if the mean exists.
Thus equation (40) can be written as:




















































Explicit solutions for the drawdown ratemt depend on the form of the utility function.


























= 0; we can write the change in











Equation (46) will be constant for a constant , so that drawdown depends entirely on
the rate of time preference and m = 1   : As the term in brackets in (47) approaches
one, the proportional change in the optimal drawdown rate varies with the discrete-time
hazard rate, t+1 =   t+1 tt . For the hyperbolic (Pareto) survival function, this hazard
rate is declining over time, so the proportional change in the drawdown also declines. The
non-monotonic survival function of the multiple-branch family will be similarly reected
in the consumption path.
For CRRA utility where U (Ct) =
C1 t
1  , and  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
and inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, an analogous result obtains.









the optimal drawdown at time t when the discount rate is constant is
m = 1  (')1= : (48)

































































































'1=; a function of the varying survival probability t, increasing with expected
returns and rising as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution rises. Hence the time-
varying discounting resulting from uncertain family survival results in subtle but impor-
tant di¤erences in optimal spending plans when compared with the constant drawdowns
under an innite horizon.
For the third case where we consider the formulation of utility in equation (13),
discounting depends on the distribution of future family size at a particular time t; which
we denote for the discrete case as the random variable Nt: Since it is necessary to specify
a distribution through time rather than at each generation g as we did in section 4.1, we
shall make an homogeneity assumption that distributional properties are the same within
generations. Drawdown rates are a function of family size in year t; Nt; scaled up by the






































and the growth rate in the drawdown depends on the expected rate of growth of the size
of the family scaled by .
An interesting special case of constant spending arises when  = 1: Here the expected
family size declines geometrically since E [Nt+1] = t+1; where  is the time t (annualised)
analogue to the generational mean E [Gg] = g and  < 1 (see equation 19). We estimate
 = 0:949; for our representative UK family, which implies  = ()1=30  0:9983: This
constant discount rate means a low constant spending rate mt = m = 1   ; close to
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0:17% p.a.
More generally, consider a family trust whose investment return is 4.75% p.a. in
real terms. (This return is close the 15 year historical average for a typical UK trust
with a well-diversied portfolio.) Figure 5 sets out a numerical estimate of the rst
450 years of the optimal drawdown of a family trust whose survival is modelled by the
Pareto distribution estimated in Figure 2 with the curvature parameter,  = 2. The
thin solid line shows the optimal spending rate using the exponential approximation to
single-branch family survival set out in Figure 1, the dotted line is the innite horizon
path where general impatience is set to zero, the dashed line is the optimal path for
the single-branch family under Pareto survival and the lighter solid curves are paths for
a three-branch family and for the trust concerned with family size. (Changing general
impatience away from zero simply moves all curves up the vertical axis by a constant
amount.)
[Insert Figure 5 here}
Declining hazard rates create a decreasing shape in the single-branch hyperbolic curve,
but the certainty of eventual extinction ensures that both the hyperbolic and exponential
drawdown rates are higher than that for an innitely lived-trust. An ideal spending
plan at  = 2 for the single-branch unitary trust begins close to 2.1% p.a., and drops
toward 1.6%. By contrast, the multiple-branch unitary family trust begins spending close
to 1.7% and increases the rate towards 1.8% before tapering o¤. The e¤ect of a lower
elasticity of intertemporal substitution ( = 2) on the trust which distributes by number
of members is to produce a conservative early drawdown (close to 1% per year), which
is later increased above the innite horizon path, before declining very gradually in later
generations.
6 Conclusion
Recent studies (Sozou, 1998; Dasgupta and Maskin, 2005; Bommier 2006) have shown
that decreasing impatience can be a rational response to horizon uncertainty. This is
a very common feature of long-term planning problems, and family trusts are just one
example of the many bodies that must consider stochastic survival. Indeed we all have
to plan for uncertain lifetimes. By contrast with family survival from a single progenitor,
which we have modelled using a Pareto distribution with hyperbolically declining hazard
rates and risk neutral survival preference, individual mortality (at least later in life) is
better tted by the increasing hazards typical of a Gompertz function. An increasing
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hazard rate suggests rationally increasing impatience, perhaps motivating the elderly
aunt who says but Ill be dead by thenas a reason for not planning as far out as next
Christmas.
In the standard intertemporal consumption model with i.i.d. returns, time-varying
hazards mean time-varying optimal drawdown rates, a result that goes against the cus-
tomary advice to trusts and endowments to spend at a constant rate. Our results have
interesting implications for family foundation trustees. Estimates for UK families along
the female line, assuming that current fertility patterns persist into the future, signal
eventual extinction for a typical family. Faced with the resulting hyperbolic survival
function, it seems hard for a trustee behaving in the interest of the family dynasty to
justify a policy of constant consumption. The ideal plan for a perpetual trust which
treats consumption among members as perfectly substitutable and does not review its
survival function, is to spend more rapidly in the near future, and steadily but more
slowly as the trust ages. The best plan for a multiple-branch family is likely to be a non-
monotone path, exhibiting increasing then decreasing impatience through time. When
the individual consumption of trust beneciaries is key, rather than simple family sur-
vival, risk aversion over wealth interacts with expected family growth to determine the
optimal path. Constant drawdown is optimal for trusts with a power utility parameter
at unity but drawdown is low early, slowly increasing and then later declining for trusts
which are less willing to transfer consumption through time.
Our results could be applied to the survival of nancial institutions such as banks,
mutual funds or hedge funds, or to more general macroeconomic questions such as the
estimation of a social discount rate. We have also set aside the issue of risk aversion over
family mortality. Both questions we leave to future work.
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Figure 1: Fitted exponential survival function for a single branch family.a




















discrete survival prob, gen 1-100
fitted exponential survival probability




where si is the
probability of family survival at generation i = t=30 and t are years. The generation i = t=30 survival
probabilities are calculated recursively from equation (21) along the female line for the 1960 birth cohort
of English and Welsh women, assuming that the likelihood of the birth of 0-4 girls exactly is constant over
time and homogeneous across the population. (See Table 1 and Table 2.) Function is tted by fminsearch
in Matlab using a simplex method for non-linear optimization to minimize the sum of squared errors
min f () =
100X
i=0
(si   exp ( exp30i))2.
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Figure 2: Fitted hyperbolic survival function for a single branch family.a



















discrete survival prob, gen 1-100
fitted pareto survival probability
aFigure shows a graph of the tted hyperbolic function ŝhyp;i =
h
1 + ̂ (30i)
i ̂=̂
where si is the
probability of family survival at generation i = t=30 and t are years. The generation i = t=30 survival
probabilities are calculated recursively from equation (21) along the female line for the 1960 birth cohort
of English and Welsh women, assuming that the likelihood of the birth of 0-4 girls exactly is constant over
time and homogeneous across the population. (See Table 1 and Table 2.) Function is tted by fminsearch
in Matlab using a simplex method for non-linear optimization to minimize the sum of squared errors








Figure: 3: Estimated hazard rate for single-branch family.a
aFigure shows the estimated exponential hazard rate ̂exp = 0:0095 and the estimated hyperbolic





where ̂ = 0:0112 and ̂ = 0:0165. See Figures 1 and 2 and the text
for estimation details.
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Figure 4: Estimated hazard rate for multiple-branch family.a
aFigure shows the probability of family extinction and survival down the female line where there
are k original mothers at generation g0 and the probability of survival at each future generation is given






g0+h 1. The ak are the
probabilities that a mother has exactly k daughters. Values of ak are taken from the last row of Table
1, the estimated distribution of daughters to the cohort of mothers born in England and Wales in 1960.
The hazard rate is the probability of extinction between generation g0 + h and g0 + h  1, conditioning




Figure 5: Optimal drawdown with survival uncertainty.a
























aFigure shows the estimated optimal spending rates with and without uncertainty over family mem-
bership and family survival for trusts with power utility preferences U (Ct) = 11 C
1 a
t , (exponential,




t ;  = 2; (family size
N(t) curve) and investment returns close to 4.75% p.a. Estimates of the risk-scaled investment re-
turns are bootstrapped from historical portfolio returns to a typical investment trust (See Satchell and
Thorp 2007). The hyperbolic survival probability of the single-branch family is given by the distri-
bution function F (t) = (1 + t) = ; ̂ = 0:0112 and ̂ = 0:0165, of the triple-branch family as





̂exp = 0:0095. The curvature parameter-scaled expectation of future family size in the E (Nt ) is
derived from the recursion equation (18). Numerical optimization is via the fminimax routine in Matlab.
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Table 1:
Estimated distribution of women of child-bearing age by number of children.a;b
Population proportion of women born 1960 having number of children (live births)by age 45
0 1 2 3 4 or more
0.18 0.13 0.38 0.20 0.10
Estimated probability of women born 1960 having number of daughters (live births) by age 45
0 1 2 3 4
a0 = 0:380 a1 = 0:355 a2 = 0:208 a3 = 0 :050 a4 = 0:007
aSource: Table 10.5, Birth Statistics, Series FM1 no.34, O¢ ce for National Statistics, London, UK.
bTop panel shows population data on births for women born 1960 in England and Wales. Lower panel
shows inferred probability of daughters by assuming that girls and boys are equally likely to be born so
if the probability that a woman from this cohort has 2 children is 0.38, the probability that one will be
a girl is 0.5x0.38 and that 2 will be girls is 0.25x0.38 etc. We use these as estimates of the probabilities
ak that a progenitor (mother) has exactly zero, one, two, three or four daughters. We assume that the
family consists of female members and the number of daughters born to each (female) family member is
a random draw from this distribution at every generation.
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Table 2:
Estimated probability of family survival and expected family size.a
Number of Single branch family Triple branch family




g = 1  (xg)3 (3)g E(G
(3)
g )
0 1.000 1.000 1.000 3.000
1 0.620 0.380 0.949 0.945 0.055 2.847
2 0.452 0.271 0.901 0.836 0.116 2.702
3 0.354 0.217 0.855 0.731 0.126 2.564
4 0.289 0.183 0.811 0.641 0.123 2.433
5 0.243 0.160 0.770 0.566 0.117 2.309
6 0.208 0.144 0.730 0.503 0.111 2.191
7 0.181 0.131 0.693 0.450 0.105 2.080
8 0.159 0.121 0.658 0.405 0.100 1.974
9 0.141 0.113 0.624 0.366 0.096 1.873
10 0.126 0.106 0.592 0.333 0.092 1.777
11 0.114 0.100 0.562 0.303 0.088 1.687
12 0.103 0.095 0.534 0.277 0.085 1.601
13 0.093 0.092 0.506 0.255 0.082 1.519
14 0.085 0.088 0.481 0.234 0.080 1.442
15 0.078 0.085 0.456 0.216 0.078 1.368
16 0.072 0.081 0.433 0.200 0.076 1.298
17 0.066 0.080 0.411 0.185 0.074 1.232
18 0.061 0.077 0.390 0.172 0.072 1.169
19 0.056 0.076 0.370 0.159 0.071 1.110
20 0.052 0.073 0.351 0.148 0.069 1.053
25 0.037 0.066 0.285 0.105 0.064 0.854
30 0.026 0.064 0.219 0.077 0.060 0.657
35 0.019 0.059 0.169 0.057 0.058 0.506
40 0.014 0.053 0.130 0.042 0.056 0.389
45 0.011 0.053 0.100 0.032 0.055 0.300
50 0.008 0.047 0.077 0.024 0.054 0.024
150  0:000  0:000  0:000  0:000
aTable shows the probability of family survival and expected family size down the female line where the
probability of extinction for a single-branch family at generation g is given by






g 1, for a three-branch family is(xg)
3
; and ak is the
probability that a mother has exactly k daughters. Values of ak are taken from the last row of Table 1,
the estimated distribution of daughters to the cohort of mothers born in England and Wales in 1960.
The recursion begins with x1 = a0 = 0:38 and continues with xed ak. Hazard rates are the probability
of extinction between generation g   1 and g, conditional on having survived to time g, which is









g = 1  xg; and s(3)g = 1  (xg)3 :
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